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ATTORNEY AS INTERPRETER:
A RETURN TO BABBLE
BILL PIATT*
Should an attorney serve as an interpreter for a non-English-
speaking client in a criminal prosecution? Out of an apparent sense
of duty to the court or client, some bilingual attorneys' have been
willing to assume that role. 2 Moreover, trial courts which have
imposed such an obligation upon counsel have generally been upheld
on appeal.3 This article examines the potential harm to the client,
counsel, and the administration of justice when an attorney acts as
an interpreter for a client in litigation, and suggests that none of
these interests are served by an attorney-interpreter.
I. THE RIGHT TO AN INTERPRETER
As with other language rights issues, problems involving inter-
preters develop because courts and counsel seem not to understand
the significance of the interests involved. 4 The lack of a coherent
recognition of language rights in this country' and the absence of
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. B.A. 1972, Eastern
New Mexico University; J.D. 1975, University of New Mexico School of Law. The author
gratefully acknowledges the assistance and advice of his colleagues, Thomas E. Baker and
Charles P. Bubany.
1. Cases in this area have dealt with counsel providing interpretation for language minority
clients. However, the same principles would apply to attorneys translating for their hearing
or speech-impaired clients. By focusing on language translation, the author intends no disregard
for the similar plight of other litigants. The importance of interpretation issues for the hearing
or speech-impaired was underlined in Terry v. State, 21 Ala. App. 100, 102, 105 So. 386,
388 (1925):
[Tihe physical infirmity of this appellant fa deaf-mute for whom no interpreter
was provided at trial] can in no sense lessen his rights under the Constitution,
and, in the proper administration of its laws, this . . . state must and will
accord the means by which its citizens . . . shall receive all the rights,
benefits, and privileges which the Constitution, laws, regulations, and rules
of practice provide.
See also the provision of interpreters for the impaired in the Court Interpreters Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1827 (1988); infra notes 18-22; Peeler v. State, 750 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988) at infra note 35.
2. See infra note 63. Although the focus of this article is on the ethical problems facing
attorney-interpreters in criminal proceedings (primarily because of sixth amendment concerns
regarding the right of a client to effective counsel and to confront witnesses), the ethical
and due process issues analyzed in Part III, infra, should make counsel equally reluctant to
interpret for a client in a civil or administrative hearing.
3. See section III, infra.
4. See Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23 Hous.
L. REv. 885 (1986).
5. See B. PtArr, ONLY ENGousH? LAw AND LANGUAGE POuCY IN THE UNrrED STATES,
University of New Mexico Press, 1990.
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any United States Supreme Court decision defining and delineating
the right to court interpreters undoubtedly adds to the uncertainty.
Yet, the use of interpreters is becoming increasingly important to
the administration of justice. For example, in 1986, interpreted
proceedings constituted six percent of all federal court hearings.
6
Examining the issues which arise when an attorney is called upon
to interpret for a client first requires some understanding of the
nature of the right to an interpreter. In addition, an understanding
of the extent to which an attorney-interpreter fulfills the obligation
of zealous advocacy is also required.
7
Through the middle of the twentieth century, courts generally held
that the appointment of an interpreter in a criminal proceeding was
a matter resting solely in the trial court's discretion.' Even after a
provision was enacted for the appointment of interpreters in criminal
proceedings in the federal courts, 9 such an appointment was still
considered to be a matter of discretion with the trial court.'0 No
constitutional right to a free simultaneous translator"1 was inferred
from the apparent power of the court to appoint an interpreter
under the rule.
12
However, in 1970, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals deter-
mined that the sixth amendment's confrontation clause, made ap-
plicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause, requires that non-English speaking defendants be
informed of their right to simultaneous interpretation of proceedings
at the government's expense. 3 Otherwise, the trial would be a
6. H.R. REP. No. 100-889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE C6NG.
& ADMIN. NEws 6018, 6019. Spanish is by far the most widely used language in these
proceedings. Interpreted proceedings utilizing languages other than Spanish accounted for only
one-third of 1076 of all federal court hearings in 1986. Id.
7. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsiBtUrrY DR 7-101 (1981); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1987).
8. Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86 (1907). Defendant sought to have an interpreter
when he was testifying. The "discretion" related to evaluation of his ability to understand
the interrogation and express himself in English. See United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889,
901 (2d Cir. 1967), aff'd, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
9. FED. R. CRaI. P. 28(b).
10. United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1967), aff'd, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
II. In Desist, the issue was not merely whether an interpreter should assist the defendant
in the presentation of his testimony, as in Perovich. Rather, defendant sought a court-
appointed interpreter to render a simultaneous translation of the proceedings, contending that
the denial of such an interpreter denied him his rights to due process and a fair trial, as
well as his right to confront witnesses, be present at trial, and have the effective assistance
of counsel. Desist, 384 F.2d at 901. The importance of the first-person simultaneous translation
is discussed in notes 46 and 47, and accompanying text, infra.
12. Desist, supra note 8, 384 F.2d at 903. See other "discretionary" provisions in FED.
R. Cri. P. 43(f); FED. R. EvID. 604; 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e).
13. United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1970).
Defendant in a murder prosecution spoke no English; defense counsel spoke no Spanish.
They were allowed to meet with an interpreter during recesses. The interpreter summarized
testimony of witnesses who had already testified. She translated trial court instructions regarding
peremptory challenges and translated into English the testimony of two Spanish-speaking
(Vol. 20
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"babble of voices. ' )14 The defendant would not understand the
testimony against him. Counsel would be hampered in effective
cross-examination." The Court went on to note:
Not only for the sake of effective cross examination, however,
but as a matter of simple humaneness, Negron deserved more
than to sit in total incomprehension as the trial proceeded.
Particularly inappropriate in this nation where many languages
are spoken is a callousness to the crippling language handicap
of a newcomer to its shores, whose life and freedom the state
by its criminal processes chooses to put in jeopardy.'
6
With Negron serving as the impetus, 17 the right to an interpreter
in the federal courts was expanded by enactment of the Court
Interpreters Act in 1978.18 The Act requires judges to utilize com-
petent interpreters in criminal or civil actions initiated by the gov-
ernment in a United States district court. 9 An interpreter must be
appointed when a party or witness speaks only or primarily in a
witnesses for the benefit of the court, the jury, and counsel. She did not translate the
testimony of fourteen English-speaking witnesses into Spanish. Nor was an interpreter available
to translate between defense counsel and the defendant. Negron, 434 F.2d at 388-89.
14. Id. at 388.
15. Id. at 389-90.
16. Id. at 390. The plight of the defendant proceeding to trial without the ability, because
of a language barrier, to understand the proceedings has also been described as "Kafka-
like." See Desist, supra note 8, 384 F.2d at 902. The Arizona Supreme Court has described
the situation as follows:
A defendant's inability to spontaneously understand testimony being given
would undoubtedly limit his attorney's effectiveness, especially on cross-
examination. It would be as though a defendant were forced to observe the
proceedings from a soundproof booth or seated out of hearing at the rear
of the courtroom, being able to observe but not comprehend the criminal
processes whereby the state had put his freedom in jeopardy. Such a trial
comes close to being an invective against an insensible object, possibly
infringing upon the accused's basic 'right to be present in the courtroom at
every stage of his trial.'
State v. Rios, 112 Ariz. 143, 144, 539 P.2d 900, 901 (1975), en banc, quoting State v.
Natividad, Ill Ariz. 191, 194, 526 P.2d 730, 733 (1974), which in turn cited Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892) and Negron, supra note 13. The Negron decision compared the
language barrier between counsel and client to the problem of client incompetency to stand
trial, quoting Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HAmv. L. REv. 454, 458 (1969) for the
proposition that "'the adjudication loses its character as a reasoned interaction ... and
becomes an invective against an insensible object."' Negron, 434 F.2d at 389.
17. The Second Circuit noted the "surprisingly sparse discussion in the case law of the
right to a translator or interpreter at criminal trials" at the time of the Negron decision.
Negron, 434 F.2d at 389. It also found the federal right to a state-provided translator to be
far from settled at the time of its holding. Negron, 434 F.2d at 390. The decision was cited
as the impetus for Congressional action. H.R. REP. No. 95-1687, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws 4652-53.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1988).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d) (1988). The Court Interpreter Amendments Act of 1988 extended
the right to an interpreter to pre-trial and grand jury proceedings. Court Interpreter Amend-
ments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 Stat. 4654, 28 U.S.C.
§1827 (nt 1)(1988); H.R. REP. No. 100-889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.. reprinted in 1989 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADNON. NEws 6018.
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language other than English or suffers from a hearing impairment,
so as to inhibit the person's comprehension of the proceedings,
communication with counsel or the judge, or so as to inhibit the
witness's comprehension of questions in the presentation of testi-
mony.20 The Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts is required to prescribe, determine, and certify the
qualifications of persons who may serve as interpreters. 21 The Director
maintains a list of interpreters and prescribes a fee schedule for
their use.Y
Courts have repeatedly determined that there is no constitutional
right to an interpreter in civil proceedings23 or in administrative
matters. 24 However, there are various state constitutional and leg-
islative provisions for interpreters. 2 These occasionally grant broader
rights than under federal law. 26
II. IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO AN INTERPRETER
Even though Negron,27 the Court Interpreters Act,21 and state
authorities 29 suggest that there are constitutional30 or statutory rights
to an interpreter, the determination as to whether a particular litigant
is entitled to an interpreter and the manner of proceeding through
the use of an interpreter is still committed to the trial court's
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d) (1988).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(b) (1988).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(b) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1827(c) (1988).
23. E.g., Jara v. Municipal Ct., 21 Cal. 3d 181, 578 P.2d 94, 145 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1067 (1979).
24. E.g., Guerrero v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 512 P.2d 833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973),
cert. denied sub nom., Guerrero v. Swoap, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974). See Note, A Right to
Translation Assistance in Administrative Proceedings, 16 CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 469
(1981). Interpretation issues are of increasing importance in other areas, including union
representation issues. The seminal work in this latter context is Gregory, Union Leadership
and Workers Voices: Meeting the Needs of Linguistically Heterogeneous Union Members, 58
CINC. L. REV. - (1989).
25. See, for example, CAL. CONST. CODE art. I, § 14 (West 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
90.606 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-10-7 (1978); N.Y. JutD. LAW § 380-390 (McKinney
1972); and TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.30 (Vernon 1988). Massachusetts provisions
are discussed in Grabau and Williamson, Language Barriers in our Trial Courts: The Use
of Court Interpreters in Massachusetts, 70 MAss. L. REv. 108 (1985).
26. Kansas, for example, provides for the appointment of interpreters for parties or
witnesses before grand juries, or in any court proceeding where a person with a language,
hearing, or speech impairment faces confinement or penal sanctions. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-
4351 (1984). The right also applies in any civil proceedings, and not just those brought by
the government, as in the Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1988). Further, the right
to an interpreter exists in administrative hearings or even when the person is arrested for
criminal or city ordinance violations.
27. Supra note 13.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1988).
29. Supra notes 25 and 26.
30. A post-Negron decision by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin finds no constitutional




discretion.3 Under traditional views of zealous advocacy, 2 counsel
for a party with a language barrier should be ethically required to
urge the Court to exercise its discretion in a manner favorable to
that client regarding these interpretation issues. Before turning to a
discussion of counsel as interpreter, it is important to consider how
counsel who is not also required to serve as an interpreter should
ordinarily proceed regarding interpretation issues in litigation.
The first issue in this context is whether a client is entitled to an
interpreter.33 Courts will ordinarily not appoint an interpreter in the
absence of a request to do so,3 4 but the failure of an attorney to
request an interpreter for a qualifying client has been held to con-
stitute ineffective assistance of counsel.3" An important consideration
for the attorney is a recognition that a client need not be totally
ignorant of the English language in order to be entitled to an
interpreter. The federal test for determining whether a right to a
language interpreter exists is basically whether the client speaks only
or primarily a language other than English.3 6 Thus, even though a
client may be able to function in English in a social conversation,
he or she may still be entitled to the use of an interpreter in litigation37
given the sophisticated language level used in the courts.38 Zealous
31. See United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907
(1974). The view still exists that the defendant's constitutional rights to confront witnesses
and due process must still be balanced against (and possibly outweighed by) the "public's
interest in the economical administration of the criminal law." United States v. Martinez,
616 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981). Martinez ignores the
Negron decision, which was eight years old at the time the defendant went to trial on December
6. 1978. The Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1988), was passed on October 28,
1978, but was held inapplicable to the defendant's case by the Fifth Circuit because it did
not take effect until ninety days after enactment. United States v. Martinez, 616 F.2d at
188.
32. MODEL CODE OF PROFss IoNA RESPONsmmarrY DR 7-101 (1981); MODEL RUtns OF
PROFESSIONAl. CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1987).
33. In general, see Annotation, Right of Accused to Have Evidence or Court Proceedings
Interpreted, 36 A.L.R. 3d 276 (1971); Chang & Araujo. Interpreters for the Defense: Due
Process for the Non-English Speaking Defendant, 63 CALIF. L. Rav. 801 (1975).
34. Suarez v. United States, 309 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1962); Diaz v. State, 491 S.W.2d 166
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Cf. Negron, 434 F.2d at 386; State v. Rios, 112 Ariz. 143, 539
P.2d 900 (1975) (en banc), citing State v. Natividad, 111 Ariz. 191, 526 P.2d 730 (1974);
People v. Sepulveda, 412 Mich. 889, 313 N.W.2d 283 (1981). The Court Interpreters Act
provides for appointment of interpreters on the court's own motion. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d).
35. Peeler v. State, 750 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); but cf. People v. McGinnis,
51 Ill. App. 3d 273, 366 N.E.2d 969 (1977).
36. See Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d).
37. But cf. Guerrero v. Harris, 461 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (defendant rarely used
interpreter and conversed in English); State v. Topete, 221 Neb. 771, 380 N.W.2d 635 (1986)
(no abuse of discretion where court did not appoint interpreter for a defendant who had
conversed with an officer and a jailer in English).
38. A study conducted by the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts pursuant
to the Court Interpreter's Act found that because of the sophisticated language level used
in the courts, a minimum of fourteen years of education is necessary to understand what
goes on in a criminal trial and more than that in a civil trial. See Seltzer v. Foley, 502 F.
Supp. 600, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Query whether this suggests the need for the appointment
of "interpreters" for all litigants with less than fourteen years of education, not just language-
minority or speech and hearing-impaired persons.
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advocacy would seem to require counsel to seek an interpreter when
there is any doubt as to whether a language barrier is inhibiting his
or her client's comprehension of the proceedings or interfering with
the presentation of evidence on the client's behalf. 9
Even if an interpreter is appointed, counsel would still be under
a duty to ensure that the interpreter is qualified to competently
interpret. In the federal system, the Director of the Administrative
Office of the Federal Courts examines and certifies interpreters and
maintains lists of certified interpreters.40 Some states also maintain
similar listings.4' In the absence of such certification, however, an
attorney should require the interpreter to demonstrate sufficient
education, training, or experience to satisfy the trial judge that he
or she can make a competent translation. 42 Although interpreters
with obvious conflicts of interest, such as a family relationship to
a witness, may be allowed to serve,' 3 opposing counsel should identify
such conflicts and object, in order to preserve a record for appeal."
39. See Peeler, 750 S.W.2d 687. For a dramatic portrayal of injustice and death resulting
from a language misinterpretation, see The Ballad of Gregorio Cortez, (Moctesuma Prod-
uctions, Inc. 1982). The movie is based upon PAREDES, WITH HIS PISTOL IN HIs HAND: A
BORDER BA.LAD AD iTS HERO (University of Texas Press, 1971).
40. Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827(b) and (c). Through 1986 the Administrative
Office of the Courts had spent over one million dollars in test development and administration
for Spanish language interpreters, had administered a Spanish interpretation test more than
seven thousand times (some took the test more than once), and yet had been able to certify
only 292 interpreters. H.R. REP. No. 100-889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1989 U.S.
CODE CoNG. & ADnmi. NEws 6019. These certified interpreters were used 33,764 times, and
non-certified Spanish language interpreters were used in another 7,737 proceedings. Id. The
administrative office now has plans to develop certification exams for Navajo and Haitian
Creole, the languages after Spanish which most require translation. The Third Branch, BULLETIN
OF Tim FEDERAL COURTS, June 1989, at 7.
41. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-10-5C (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
42. State v. Van Pham, 234 Kan. 649, 675 P.2d 848 (1984). The difficulty, in general,
of the rendition of a competent interpretation is highlighted in Berk-Seligson, The Importance
of Linguistics in Court Interpreting, 2 LA RAzA L.J. 14 (1988). Among the factors Ms. Berk-
Seligson identifies as reasons why interpretation from a "source" language into a "target"
language is not always a "high fidelity rendition" is the fact that specialized vocabularies
exist within languages for many endeavors, ranging from the playing of marbles, for example,
to the practice of medicine. Also, the style of speech in the courtroom ranges from person
to person and even within the same person, from casual to formal. Attorneys in particular
vary language styles in the course of a single trial depending upon the topic and witness.
In addition, the author identifies the difference between "lexical equivalents" and "true
sentence meaning," influenced by many considerations including politeness, socio-economic
background differences, and other concerns.
43. In general, see Annotation, Disqualification, for Bias, of One Offered as Interpreter
of Testimony, 6 A.L.R. 4th 158 (1981). At least one court has taken the position that it is
not error per se for a court to select a close friend or relative of a witness to serve as the
witness' interpreter. Kotas v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 445 (Ky. 1978). Some cases even
permit biased interpreters. State in Interest of R.R., 79 N.J. 97, 398 A.2d 76 (1979) (mother
of 4-year-old victim as interpreter for son to interpret his words and gestures); Tores v.
State, 63 S.W. 880 (Tex. Crim. 1901) (assistant district attorney as interpreter for prosecution
witness). See also Grabau & Williamson, supra note 25, at 113.
44. There is authority requiring a hearing on the issue of interpreter competence and bias.
Kley v. Abell, 483 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. Cr. App. 1972). Still, an interpreter need not be the
"least interested person available" in order to qualify for appointment. Robinson v. State,
444 So. 2d 902 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).
[Vol. 20
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Assuming the court appoints a competent, unbiased interpreter,
counsel's obligations would not be complete. The record would still
need to be protected in order to challenge possible misinterpretations
at trial or on appeal. Counsel should ordinarily insist on a simul-
taneous translation.4 5 In view of the fact that the court reporter
only transcribes the English dialogue,46 counsel should insist on a
"first-person" translation to avoid a garbled record.47 Further, in
most instances, zealous advocacy requires that counsel insist on
having two interpreters in the courtroom.4 One would translate
45. Negron, 434 F.2d at 386. The general requirement of a simultaneous interpretation
in the federal courts was added by section 709 of the Court Interpreters Amendments Act
of 1988, Pub. L. 100-702, § 709, 102 Stat. 4656-57 (1988) (codified in 28 U.S.C. §1827(k)).
46. People v. Martinez, 7 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 289 N.E.2d 76 (1972).
47. The creation of a clearer record through the use of the first person when the interpreter
translates the witness's response (and the use of second person by counsel) can be illustrated
by the following exchange:
I. Attorney (in English): "What is your name?"
2. Interpreter (in foreign language to witness): "What is your name?"
3. Witness (in foreign language): "My name is John Doe."
4. Interpreter (in English): "My name is John Doe."
See Henry, On the Record, N.M. ST. BAR BULL., Feb. 17, 1983, Special Insert, p. 2.
Use of the first person creates a more intelligible record than if the interpreter responds,
"He says his name is John Doe." The court reporter will only be transcribing the English
dialogue. See People v. Martinez, 7 11. App. 3d 1075, 289 N.E.2d 76 (1972). In the example
above, only lines I and 4 would appear in the transcript. In this simple example, no great
confusion would occur if the interpreter had responded in the third person. In more complicated
exchanges, however, the record could become garbled if the interpreter translates in the third-
person:
Q. Ask him who was there.
A. He says his friends, Juan and Fred.
Q. Ask him if he signed the paper.
A. He said they did.
Q. Who did?
A. He said him and Juan.
However, it has been held that the right to an interpreter does not guarantee the right to
a literal translation. State v. Cabodi, 18 N.M. 513, 138 P. 262 (1914); State v. Van Pham,
675 P.2d at 848. But cf. Negron, 434 F.2d at 389, disapproving witness summaries.
48. This author has frequently used the following (admittedly absurd) example to dem-
onstrate why, without the presence of two interpreters, an interpretation error could be made
without anyone in the courtroom even being aware an error had occurred:
I. Attorney (in English): "What is your name?"
2. Interpreter (in foreign language to witness): "What did you eat for break-
fast?"
3. Witness (in foreign language): "Ham and eggs."
4. Interpreter (in English): "My name is John Doe."
Obviously there is no "third person" problem with this translation. The problem is a
misinterpretation. If all attorneys and parties only speak English and if the witness only
speaks the foreign language, the only person in the room who knows an error has been
made is the interpreter. If the interpreter does not intentionally make the error, but rather
makes the error for a lack of precision in one or both languages, nobody will catch the
error. The record will only contain lines I and 4, which is not an accurate reflection of the
witness's testimony. Accordingly, to protect the client's interests, an attorney should have
his or her own interpreter in addition to the "court" interpreter. (Two interpreters were
appointed in Van Pham, 675 P.2d at 856.) The interpreter sitting with counsel would
immediately notify counsel of the translation error. Counsel could timely object and call the
second interpreter as a witness, if need be. If the attorney were bilingual, he or she would
Winter 19901
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witness testimony and proceedings for the record. The other would
facilitate communication between counsel and client, and advise
counsel of any translation errors made by the first, or "court"
interpreter. Finally, counsel should insist that testimony be tape-
recorded where an interpreter is used, for correcting errors at trial
or for transmission with the record on appeal if necessary.
4 9
At this point, the difficulties facing an attorney who attempts to
serve both as counsel and an interpreter should begin to appear
obvious, as should the harm to the client's interests. However, courts
and counsel have failed to see these difficulties in the majority of
cases where the issue has arisen. With an understanding of the nature
of the interpretation process, we turn now to an examination of
these cases and to an analysis of why the procedure they approve
is harmful to clients, counsel, and the administration of justice.
III. COUNSEL AS INTERPRETER
In some pre-Negron cases courts encountered no difficulty in
finding that the right to confront witnesses in a criminal proceeding
was satisfied where defense counsel understood the testimony even
though the defendant did not.5 0 Other cases focus on the fact that
the accused was apparently able to communicate with bilingual
counsel, in finding no abuse of discretion for failure to appoint an
interpreter.' Thus, the presence of counsel who could communicate
with their respective clients in French," Italian," Polish5 4 as well
catch the error without the second interpreter but would be ethically prohibited from both
testifying and still continuing as counsel. See discussion Part III infra.
Another reason why two interpreters are necessary relates to the client's need to consult
with monolingual counsel. State v. Neave, 177 Wis. 2d 359, 344 N.W.2d 181 (1984). Consider
the scenario where an English-speaking attorney represents a Spanish-speaking client in a
criminal trial. A prosecution witness testifies in Spanish. An interpreter translates into English
for benefit of court and counsel, thereby enabling defendant, through counsel to confront
the witness. However, defendant could not point out inaccuracies to defense counsel without
either halting the proceedings and having the interpreter approach counsel table, or waiting
until the end of the witness's testimony when memory has faded or the time for objection
has passed. In any event, there would exist potential damage to the client's right to maintain
confidential communication with defense counsel, particularly if the interpreter were a pros-
ecuting attorney, police officer, or friend or relative of the victim. See supra note 43.
Cf. People v. Aranda, 186 Cal. App. 3d 230, 230 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1986) (no constitutional
right to a second interpreter, at least not where defense counsel is bilingual); Compare People
v. Estrada, 176 Cal. App. 3d 410, 415-16, 221 Cal. Rptr. 922, 924 (1986) (recognizing a
right to a second interpreter, though not necessarily a certified interpreter; waiver of that
right by bilingual defense counsel, with apparent approval of defendant, upheld).
49. See Van Pham, 675 P.2d at 848.
50. Escobar v. State, 30 Ariz. 159, 161, 245 P. 356, 358-59 (1926); Luera v. State, 124
Tex. Crim. 507, 509, 63 S.W.2d 699, 701 (1933).
51. People v. Pelegri, 39 Ill. 2d 568, 573, 237 N.E.2d 453, 458 (1968).
52. United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1967), aff'd, 394 U.S. 244 (1969). The
trial judge, Judge Palmieri, also spoke French. Desist, 384 F.2d at 899. See infra note 57,
regarding foreign language ability of the trial judge. The ability of the Desist defendants to
hire a private interpreter was also determined to obviate the need for an interpreter at
government expense. Desist, 384 F.2d at 902.
53. People v. Vitale, 3 I1. 2d 99, 101, 119 N.E.2d 784, 786-87 (1954).
54. Szukiewicz v. Warden, 213 Md. 636, 637, 131 A.2d 390, 391 (1957).
[Vol. 20
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as Spanish," was held to obviate the need for the appointment of
an interpreter. The "bald assertion" that an attorney who was forced
to act as the client's interpreter could not thereby function effectively
as counsel was found to be without merit in a case involving a
Spanish-speaking defendant and bilingual counsel.5 6 As a further
variation on this theme, the presence of a bilingual judge was held
to satisfy the constitutional right of a Spanish-speaking defendant
to confront witnesses in a criminal proceeding.
7
Even after Negron, the failure of a trial court to appoint an
interpreter has been held not to violate the defendant's rights where
bilingual counsel was present.5 8 Some of these cases involved language
interpretation issues in the context of a full trial.59 In others, the
issue of the right to an interpreter has arisen at pretrial proceedings,
6
0
the entry of a guilty plea, 6' or at sentencing.6 2 In still other cases,
defense counsel volunteered to serve as interpreter or at least did
not object, thereby waiving what otherwise would have been a right
to an interpreter had the defendant been represented by monolingual
counsel 63
In a very few cases, however, courts have recognized that the
presence of bilingual counsel cannot possibly satisfy the confrontation
clause and due process clause concerns.6 4This right to an independent
55. People v. Pelegri, 39 Ill. 2d 568, 573, 237 N.E.2d 453, 458 (1968).
56. United States v. Paroutian,' 299 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1962).
57. United States v. Sosa, 379 F.2d 525, 527 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845 (1967);
Mares v. United States, 391 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1968).
58. United States v. Martinez, 616 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
994 (1981); United States v. Rodriguez, 424 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841
(1970); Briones v. State, 595 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Diaz v. State, 491 S.W.2d
166, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); People v. Arias. 47 A.D.2d 561, 363 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1975);
People v. Martinez, 7 111. App. 3d 1075, 1077, 289 N.E.2d 76, 78 (1972); People v. Rivera,
7 Ill. App. 3d 983, 289 N.E.2d 36 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973).
59. Diaz, 491 S.W.2d at 166; Martinez, 616 F.2d at 185; Rodriguez, 424 F.2d at 205.
60. Rivera, 7 111. App. 3d at 983, 289 N.E.2d at 36.
61. Briones, 595 S.W.2d at 546; People v. Martinez, 7 Il. App. 3d at 1075, 289 N.E.2d
at 76.
62. Arias, 47 A.D.2d at 561, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
63. In United States v. Martinez, defense counsel "assured the court that he was 'absolutely'
able to act as an interpreter for his client." 616 F.2d at 187.
In People v. Sepulveda, 102 Mich. App. 777, 778, 302 N.W.2d 256, 257 (1980), the court
noted the following "waiver" by counsel: "Court: Can you interpret for him? Attorney:
Yes, as his attorney I will state for the record that I am bilingual. I speak Spanish fluently
and have explained to him the various aspects of the case." The defendant's conviction,
which was upheld by the Court of Appeals of Michigan, was ultimately reversed and remanded.
People v. Sepulveda, 412 Mich. 889, 890, 313 N.W.2d 283, 284 (1981). The Supreme Court
of Michigan found reversible error in the failure to appoint an interpreter where the record
clearly shows the defendant spoke no English whatsoever. Id.
64. State v. Rios, 112 Ariz. 143, 145, 539 P.2d 900, 902 (1975); People v. Sepulveda,
412 Mich. 889, 313 N.W.2d 283 (1981); See also Baltierra v. State, 586 S.W.2d 553, 559 n.
II (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (appointed counsel fluent in defendant's language affords the
ability to communicate, a basic aspect of effective assistance of counsel and an obligation
of counsel, but does not satisfy the right of confrontation, the satisfaction of which is the
duty of the court).
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interpreter has been upheld even in the face of the attempt by
bilingual counsel to waive it.6
s
Given such a split of authority, however, it is likely that in many
instances courts will continue to uphold the trial court's determination
not to appoint an interpreter where the client is represented by
bilingual counsel, at least in the circumstances where counsel enters
no objection to the procedure. In view of Negron," the Court
Interpreters Act,6 7 and state provisions and decisions,6 reliance on
the attorney as interpreter raises issues of overlapping concern to
client and counsel alike. Should courts permit the compromising of
a language minority client's right to participate and assist at trial, 69
the dilution of the client's right to the effective assistance of counsel,
70
and risk the loss of an adequate appellate record,7' for the sole
reason that the client's attorney has additional language abilities?
Should bilingual attorneys, who are state-licensed officers of the
court with their reputations and professional licenses on the line
each time they appear on behalf of a client, be denied the full
concentration required of all trial counsel 7 but thereby granted only
to monolingual attorneys?
73
The failure of courts to address these issues can produce potentially
severe consequences. Language minority clients may be convicted
without the traditional safeguards afforded to English-speaking clients
or to other language minority clients with monolingual counsel.
Bilingual attorneys can be subjected to state-imposed sanctions for
participation without objection in the process.7 ' Counsel should be-
come sensitized to these issues. On behalf of themselves, and con-
sistent with their ethical obligation of zealous advocacy, they should
urge courts to apply local statutes and rules to afford separate
interpreters.
Constitutional ramifications should not go unnoticed. Even though
there has been no Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject of
a constitutional right to an interpreter, and although lower courts
have often reached contradictory conclusions on the subject, the
Supreme Court has found a due process right to state-furnished
"basic tools," including psychiatric experts on behalf of indigents. 75
65. Sepulveda, 412 Mich. at 889, 313 N.W.2d at 283; People v. Chavez, 124 Cal. App.
3d 215, 220, 177 Cal. Rptr. 306, 311 (1981).
66. Supra note 13.
67. Supra note 18.
68. Supra notes 25 and 26.
69. See Negron, supra note 13.
70. Infra note 84.
71. Supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
72. Supra note 64.
73. See generally supra section Ill.
74. In this author's view, for the reasons set forth below, such conduct warrants sanction.
75. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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Similarly, a showing of particularized need for an interpreter coupled
with a showing as to why a bilingual attorney cannot fulfill the
need should lead to a conclusion that the failure to appoint a separate
interpreter violates due process. In addition, Negron teaches that
confrontation clause and due process violations occur when a lan-
guage minority client does not have an interpreter to confront adverse
witnesses. Negron also refers to a standard of "simple humaneness." 1 6
Counsel should invoke these concerns as well in resisting the dual
appointment as attorney and interpreter.
There are also equal protection considerations. The only apparent
reason why courts require counsel to also serve as interpreters is to
save the money which would otherwise be paid by the court to
independent interpreters. Assuming that such a scheme effectively
deprives the client of either the attorney or the interpreter to which
the client would otherwise be entitled, the situation appears analogous
to equal protection problems identified by the Supreme Court where
state court schemes denied indigent defendants appellate transcripts.77
Counsel should be willing to point out to the courts other specific
problems caused by the use of counsel as interpreter. For example,
courts have generally not made the required inquiry into the inter-
pretation competence 71 of bilingual counsel. In many cases, no ap-
parent inquiry was made into counsel's competence as an interpreter
before determining that he or she should serve in that capacity.
79
In other cases, courts relied solely upon the attorney's assertion of
interpretation competence in making the decision not to appoint an
independent interpreter s° Yet, an interpreter ordinarily cannot, upon
his or her own blanket assertion of competence, qualify for ap-
pointment."
Moreover, even though trial courts have been given wide discretion
to appoint as interpreters persons with obvious bias,' 2 inherent con-
flict issues flowing from the attorney-client relationship seem in-
surmountable if courts and counsel wish to preserve any of the
traditional ethical and due process concerns. For example, the at-
torney who interprets for a client at trial may well end up testifying
against the client on appeal if an issue as to the adequacy of the
76. 434 F.2d at 390. Another reference to due process?
77. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
78. See supra notes 21, 22, 40-42, and accompanying text.
79. United States v. Martinez. 616 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 450 U.S.
994 (1981); Briones v. State, 595 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
80. People v. Martinez, 7 I1. App. 3d 1075, 1076, 289 N.E.2d 76, 77 (1972); People v.
Sepulveda, 102 Mich. App. 777, 778. 302 N.W.2d 256, 257 (1980), rev'd, 412 Mich. 889,
313 N.W.2d 283 (1981).
81. State v. Van Pham, 234 Kan. 649, 657, 675 P.2d 848, 856 (1984). See also Court
Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827, and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-10-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1987),
requiring certification of interpreter.
82. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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translation is raised. 3 Even though the issue of effective assistance
of trial counsel is occasionally raised in criminal appeals, s8 there
seems to be no good reason for counsel to agree to inject an
additional potential area of conflict between themselves and clients. 5
These concerns are not limited to the attorney-client relationship
at trial. For example, the entry of a guilty plea has traditionally
been viewed as the waiver of constitutionally protected rights.8 6 These
rights include the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to
trial by jury, as well as the right to confront witnesses.8 7 Waiver
of these rights cannot be presumed from a silent record. 8 The waiver
traditionally can only be made by the defendant personally and not
by counsel.8 9 When a bilingual attorney agrees to interpret for his
or her client at this stage of the proceedings, the attorney runs the
risk of effectively testifying against his client if the issue on appeal
is whether, because of the language barrier, the client made a knowing
and intelligent waiver of the rights set forth above.9 In such an
appeal, the client would be arguing no waiver could have occurred
because the "interpreter," who had not been certified as such, did
not effectively communicate to the defendant a sufficient under-
standing of the interests at stake to constitute a waiver. Upholding
the plea in such a circumstance is tantamount to our courts, with
the approval and participation of defense counsel, telling language
minority defendants:
1. You have a right to confront your accusers;
2. That right is not lost if you can't understand your accusers;
83. In People v. Aranda, 186 Cal. App. 3d 230, 230 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1986), defendant's
trial counsel actually submitted an affidavit on behalf of the state on appeal:
Based on my experience as a criminal trial attorney, and on my ability to
speak and understand some Spanish as a result of having had two years of
Spanish in high school, I did not feel there were any accuracy or other
problems with respect to the interpretation of Mrs. Varela's testimony at
trial. Had I felt there was a problem with the translation, I would have
brought the matter to the attention of the court. It is my belief that the
interpretation of Mrs. Varela's testimony had no effect on the case.
Aranda, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 237-38, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
84. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
85. Once counsel learns, or it becomes obvious that he or she will be called as a witness
other than on behalf of the client, the attorney can only continue representation of the client
until it is apparent the lawyer's testimony may be prejudicial to the client. MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102B; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules
1.7(b), 3.7. Unless counsel is going to testify that he or she is an incompetent translator,
the testimony will always prejudice the client and the attorney would be required to withdraw
as counsel.
86. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. State v. Neave, 117 Wis. 2d 359, 365, 344 N.W.2d 181, 187-88 (1984).
90. Briones v. State, 595 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); People v. Martinez,
7 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 289 N.E.2d 76 (1972).
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3. That right is lost if you can't understand this inquiry as to
whether you wish to waive the right to confront your accusers,
because of interpretation errors by your own counsel.
Confidentiality of client communications 9' might also be sacrificed.
During the course of the inquiry regarding entry of the plea, the
attorney-interpreter should be sworn to make a complete translation. 9
Up to that point, the client should have been made aware that his
or her communications to counsel are confidential. In the course
of discussing the basis for the entry of the guilty plea, what if the
client makes a statement which may adversely affect him or her at
sentencing? Does the attorney comply with the oath to make a
translation or with the ethical requirement of confidentiality?
Further, the ethical burden of zealous advocacy93 imposed upon
trial counsel and the right of the client to effective representation 9
should preclude an attorney from serving as an interpreter should
the matter proceed to trial. It would be physically impossible for
counsel to cross-examine witnesses, listen attentively to testimony
and objections of opposing counsel, hear rulings and remarks of
the judge, and still simultaneously render an accurate and complete
translation of the proceeding to the client. 95 Even where one inter-
preter is present to translate for the benefit of the court, bilingual
counsel should still have available a second interpreter to testify in
the event of a language misinterpretation. 96 Otherwise, bilingual
counsel must testify regarding the interpretation error if he or she
wants to correct it or perfect the record for appeal, and then-argue
the point as counsel. Such conduct is ethically impermissible.
97
Finally, there is the troublesome result that the presence of bilingual
counsel in these circumstances results in lesser protection to the
client's interests than if counsel were monolingual, while at the same
time exposing bilingual counsel to greater ethical risks. Bilingual
attorneys who are aware of their clients' language limitations would
not wish to risk the waiver of an interpreter that might result should
the court happen to overhear their conversations with their clients
in another language. 9 The only safe course of conduct would be
to limit all communications with the client, at least in the presence
of the court, to communication through an interpreter. This would
91. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6.
92. People v. Chavez. 124 Cal. App. 3d 215, 225, 177 Cal. Rptr. 306, 312 (1981); State
v. Van Pham, 234 Kan. 649, 659, 675 P.2d 848, 858 (1984).
93. Supra note 7.
94. Supra note 84.
95. State v. Rios, 112 Ariz. 143, 144, 539 P.2d 900, 901 (1975).
96. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
97. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102(A); MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7(b), 3.7.
98. See United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1967), aff'd, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
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hamper communication between attorney and client and result in
violations of what should be the right of each to communicate in
their language of choice.9 If no interpreter were appointed and
counsel nonetheless chose to communicate with the client, the at-
torney would run the risk of waiver.' °° If counsel were to sit silent
vis-a-vis the client, he or she would almost certainly fall below the
standard of zealous advocacy.' 0' The client would be denied effective
assistance of counsel.' 0 ' The client would experience a "babble of
voices"'0 3 with the trial being an "invective against an insensible
object.' 10 4 The client effectively would be excluded from his or her
own trial.'0 5 If the current majority view continues, language minority
clients and their bilingual counsel may be placed in the bizarre
position of considering moving the court to appoint monolingual
counsel in order to guarantee the right to an adequate interpreta-
tion. 06
Given what appear to be some fairly self-evident problems when
counsel serve as interpreters for their own clients, one cannot help
but wonder why the situation has continued. Monolingual judges
may have been unaware of the inherent difficulties in the under-
standing of courtroom testimony and the presentation of an effective
case in the presence of a language barrier. The lack of any United
States Supreme Court decision defining and applying the right to
an interpreter undoubtedly adds to uncertainties as to the exact
nature and parameters of the right. Viewing the situation somewhat
less charitably, judges may have been aware of the difficulties. They
may have chosen not to rectify them, acting on the same fear,
apprehension, and hostility sometimes exhibited by monolingual peo-
ple toward a language they do not understand and toward the people
who must employ that language to survive and function in this
society.' °7 Concerns about the cost of providing interpreters have
undoubtedly played some role as well.' °0
Bilingual attorneys may have hesitated to object to being required
to interpret for their clients. They may have hesitated out of deference
to the court or out of some perceived greater sense of duty to a
99. See Piatt, supra notes 4 and 5.
100. Desist, 384 F.2d at 889; see also cases cited in note 57.
101. Supra note 7.
102. Peeler v. State, 750 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. App. 1988); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
103. United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 388 (2d Cir. 1970).
104. State v. Rios, 112 Ariz. 143, 144, 539 P.2d 900, 901 (1975) (quoting State v. Natividad,
111 Ariz. 191, 194, 526 P.2d 730, 733 (1974)).
105. Id.
106. Cf. Cervantes v. Cox, 350 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1965) (Spanish-speaking indigent
defendant has no right to Spanish-speaking appointed counsel).
107. See Piatt, supra notes 4 and 5.




client who has placed a great deal of trust in that attorney based
upon the common language shared by counsel and client. They may
have hesitated out of concern that they would somehow appear less
competent as attorneys to court or client if they did not demonstrate
an ability to interpret the proceedings for the apparent benefit of
both.
Whatever the previous motivations of court and counsel, it should
now appear obvious that it is unfair to the client when his or her
attorney must serve as interpreter in court. The client, obviously,
cannot enter his or her own objection because of a lack of under-
standing of the language and the process.' °9 Thus it becomes in-
cumbent upon counsel and the courts to protect the due process
and confrontation rights of clients who are not fluent in English.
Proper and timely requests for competent interpreters and the pres-
ervation of a record should be the required level of conduct of trial
counsel. Proper and timely objections based upon the considerations
set forth in this article should be made and preserved where the
court considers relying upon bilingual counsel as an interpreter.
Judges should be sensitive to the language issue even if counsel
is not. The observance of an exchange between counsel and client
in another language should trigger an inquiry from the court as to
whether an interpreter is required,"10 rather than serve as the basis
for the court's determination that no interpreter is needed.'' Courts
should find a waiver of the right to an interpreter only after a
hearing on the record using an interpreter to explain to the language
109. The following was held not to constitute a request for an interpreter:
Question to defendant by defense "Well, the question I'm asking you
counsel: and you-you answered partly right
and partly-I don't think you-either
you misunderstood me or something.
What you are saying is, that you have
in the past drank enough that you
have no knowledge of what was going
on around you and no recollection
of what had happened to you or where
you have been, is this true?"
Answer by defendant: "I wish I can have a interpreter, but
I don't have a interpreter. See, some-
times I say something I'm not sup-
posed to say and sometimes I say
something wrong. I just say what I
know the way -"
The Court: "You just listen very carefully to the
man's questions. I think you can get
along all right, to either of the law-
yers. they'll put their questions to you
pretty clearly, I think."
Diaz v. State, 491 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
110. See People v. Chavez, 124 Cal. App. 3d 215, 227, 177 Cal. Rptr. 306, 313 (1981).
III. See cases cited supra note 58.
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minority litigant the nature and extent of the right to a translation."'
If the confrontation clause guarantees "face-to-face" contact"3 it
should also guarantee "ear-to-ear" contact.
IV. CONCLUSION
Like it or not, and in spite of the efforts of many,"' we are
rapidly becoming a bilingual society."' The fairness, or lack of
fairness, with which we treat language minority people who come
before our courts will serve as an important measure of our will-
ingness to implement our constitutional guarantees on behalf of all
people who appear in our courts, and not just those who happen
to speak fluent English. If attorneys continue to interpret for language
minority clients, those clients will effectively be forced to defend
themselves in an adversary system without an advocate or to observe
helplessly while a babble of voices strips them of their liberty and
property.
112. This is the process required by the Court Interpreters Act, and the New Mexico Court
Interpreters Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-10-6 (1978).
113. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798.
114. The "U.S. English" organization and others seek to have states, and eventually the
federal government, adopt provisions making English the "official" language of the United
States. A critique of this approach appears in the article and book by this author cited at
notes 4 and 5 supra. On October 6, 1988, Walter Cronkite resigned from the advisory board
of "U.S. English" after learning of a memo by John Tanton, co-founder of the organization.
The memo depicted an America possibly doomed to conflict between a minority of educated
English speakers and a majority of uneducated, poor people of ethnic and racial groups with
faster population growth. On October 17, 1988, another board member, Linda Chavez,
resigned because she was told major contributors to the group advocated extraordinary views
on population and immigration control, including advocacy of forced sterilization. Cronkite
Tenders Resignation in Reaction to English Memo, Lubbock Avalanche-Journal (Lubbock,
Texas), October 18, 1988, at 6-C.
115. See Piatt, supro note 4, at 899.
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